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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION: DISPOSITION
OF RENTS AND PROFITS OF REALTY
In this article it is my purpose to briefly trace the develop-
ment of the law concerning the rents and profits of realty,
particularly as it is treated during the period of probate ad-
ministration. I propose to compare the law as applied in our
Montana courts with that existing in other jurisdictions, show-
ing their common origin and the apparent reason for their
differing, especially as regards the problem of who has a right
to the possession of the rents and profits of realty during the
period that an estate is before the probate court for adminis-
tration.
It will be well, before answering several questions that
come to mind on this subject, to outline concisely the treatment
accorded to realty of a deceased person from earliest commob
law to the present. In doing this we should remember that the
rents and profits of realty are universally construed as an in-
cident to ownership of realty and must be treated as such, the
rents and profits following ownership of the fee;' or as it is
defined in Black's Law Dictionary', rents and profits commonly
signify a chattel real interest in land.
The common law of England took form and growth under
the influences of the feudal system in its original vigor; feudal
principles constitute one of its essential features and deter-
mine wholly its policy in respect of real estate. Whatever
rights of ownership are now enjoyed by English landholders
have been granted by acts of parliament in derogation of the
common law as in conflict with feudal principles.! Since at
common law no English subject could hold land allodially, or in
absolute ownership, but held it on condition of rendering serv-
ices and duties, and under purely voluntary grants from the
feudal lord, it follows that feudal grants could not be taken for
the debts of the tenant, either before or after his death, nor
devolve by succession upon his heir or devisee.! Nor had the
personal representative of a deceased feudal tenant the slightest
claim to, or interest in, the fee held by the decedent, for the fee
reverted t0 the lord; neither creditors nor next of kin were
entitled thereto, and if it passed on to the heir it was not by
136 WORDs & PHERASS (Perm. ed. 1940) 908, 921, 926 and cases cited.
'Third edition 1933.
'1 WoEaNEm, THa AME icAN LAw oF ADnMINIstATIoN (3rd ed. 1923)
§14 and statutes cited.
'2 B. Comm. §§51 to 54.
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descent or in the right of the ancestor, but by a renewed grant
from the lord.'
Feuds finally became hereditary, and the unconditional
descent of lands from the ancestor to the heir was secured by a
statute which abolished the court of wards and liveries along
with various other oppressive services and duties which had at-
tached to the holding of property. This statute operated as a
confirmation of title in the heir, but creditors were not allowed
to subject lands in the hands of the heirs to the satisfaction of
their claims against the ancestor. Consequently executors and
administrators whose principal function is to pay creditors out
of the estate left by decedents had no interest in or duties with
reference to such lands. The law subsequently gave recogni-
tion to the rights of creditors in a series of statutes, culminating
in 3 & 4 WILLIAM IV. c. 104 which makes real estate of a de-
ceased person liable for simple contract debts as well as for
specialties.
This dual nature of the English law (statutory recognition
of the right to own land with all its coincident rights and duties
as against the common law feudal system of enforcing such
rights and duties) sometimes produces antagonism between its
content and form, and thus violates in its provisions the strict
requirements of logic. A notable instance of this may be found
in the rule that the legal ownership of personal property de-
scends to the executor or administrator but that of real prop-
erty to the devisees or heirs. The rule arose out of the feudal
tenure of lands, which could not, as shown above, go to the
personal representative, because neither the creditors nor the
heirs had any right thereto. The gradual conversion of this
tenure into an ownership possessing all the essential qualities
of property except the name, removed the foundation and rea-
son of the rule; but the rule remained-a form void of essence,
a body from which the soul had fled.'
Under the civil law the acceptance of the succession by the
heirs rendered them personally liable for the ancestor's debts,
and in Louisiana the heir has the right to so qualify his ac-
ceptance that he may avoid such personal liability by abandon-
ing the effects so received to the ancestor's creditors.! It is
'Id. §§54 et seq.
'STATuTE 12 CHARTS II c. 24.
'The foregoing historical sketch is largely an excerpt from 1 WomsNEa,
op. cit. supre note 3, §§15, 16, with additional matter gleaned from
ATKINSON os WiuLs (1937) §§198, 199, 218, 219; 2 PAGE ON WnLS
(2d ed. 1926) §1296.
'Succession of Murray (1889) 41 La. Ann. 1112, 7 So. 126. And see
ATKINSON ON WIUS (1937) J§198, 199 and cases cited.
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evident that under such a system it was hazardous for the heir
to accept unless in the most favorable circumstances, since the
ancestor's debts might absorb not only the property so received
but also the individual estate of the heir. Thus, under the ciAl
law great injustice might be done the heir by absorbing both
the ancestor's and his own property, and under the common
law a like injustice might result to the creditors by allowing
the heir to take valuable lands free of debts where he had not
been bound by any specialty. Even after the heir was made
liable by statute for simple contract debts of the decedent, the
heir or devisee could escape liability by transferring to a bona
fide purchaser before suit by the creditors. The reason this
could be done at common law was that the ancestor's debts,
even by specialty, were not charged as a lien on the lands. As
a consequence of these extremely opposed views, when the legis-
latures of the various states came to enact statutes for control
of probate of decedent's estates, most of them made radical
departures from both in order to do equal justice to creditors
on the one side, and heirs, devisees, and legatees on the other.
With the exception of certain specified exemptions, homestead
rights and the like, a debtor's entire estate both real and per-
sonal may be taken under these statutes for his debts while
he lives and is charged with them at his death. A testator can
not deprive his creditors of property out of which they may
enforce payment of their debts by disposing of it by will in a
manner inconsistent with the rights of the creditors.'
Turning now to the first question for consideration, where
land has been specifically devised, does the devisee or the ex-
ecutor take the rents and profits from the land during the pe-
riod of probate administration?
As was pointed out supra, the general common law rule
applied in this country in the absence of statutory provisions
was that realty, or lands, tenements, and hereditaments went
directly to the heirs or devisees. Since most states have adopt-
ed the common law except as modified by statute, this rule
would prevail; but there have been placed on the books a maze
of statutory exceptions and modifications. Among the more
important are those which subject realty and personalty alike
to administration, those which make realty subject to adminis-
tration only when needed to pay debts of the decedent, and
those which allow the realty to descend subject to a power in
'Blinn v. McDonald (1899) 92 Tex. 604, 606, 607, 46 S. W. 787, 788;
and see 2 JAMAN ON WILs (Bigelow, 5th ed. 1881) p. 582; 2 PAGE ON
WiLLs (2d ed. 1926) p. 2153; 3 WoERNER op. cit. supra note 3, §490.
*02 PAGE ON Wrrx (2d ed. 1926) p. 2156 and cases cited.
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the executor or administrator to sell if necessary, or on the
happening of a contingency named.' It naturally follows that
rents and profits accruing after the deceased owner's death
belong to the heirs or devisees as an incident to the ownership
of the land which descends to them, subject of course to the
above mentioned statutory modifications and a different intent
expressed by the testator in the will."
The states which have modified the common law by statute
fall roughly into two classifications. The first comprises those
states, including Montana, which have abrogated the old com-
mon law distinctions between realty and personalty almost en-
tirely as far as liability to administration of decedent's estates
goes and give full power and control over the realty to the per-
sonal representative." The other (which includes the larger
number) comprises those in which the legislature, and more
particularly the courts, have proceeded with hesitation in cut-
ting away from the common law and thus occupy a middle
ground between the former and the common-law states. In
the latter group of states the executor or administrator has only
a qualified right over the real estate, the right being permis-
sive, not imperative, and depending on the realty being neces-
sary for the payment of debts of the decedent.
In the former class the personal representative is given
full control over both realty and personalty during the period
of probate administration. The right to possession of the
realty, and incidentally to the rents and profits thereof, is
solely with the representative whether the estate be solvent or
not. He may bring any of the usual possessory actions in re-
gard to realty in his own name as against third persons, or even
against the heirs or devisees."' In these states the representative
is in privity with and represents the owner of the realty, the
"In re McGovern's Estate (1926) 77 Mont. 182, 250 P. 812; 2 WoaaNEZ
op. ct. supra note 3, §276.
'2In re Higgins' Estate (1895) 15 Mont. 474, 39 P. 506: Murphy v. Nett
(1915) 51 Mont. 82, 149 P. 713; In re Dolenty's Estate (1916) 53
Mont. 33, 161 P. 524; In re Bradfield's Estate (1923) 69 Montana
247, 221 P. 531; In re Jennings' Estate (1925) 74 Mont 449, 241 P.
648; Estate of Woodworth (1867) 31 Cal. 595; In re De Bernal's
Estate (1913) 165 Cal. 223, 131 P. 375. Also see ATxINSON ON WILLS
(1937) §219; 2 WOERNER op. cit. supra note 3, §300 and cases cited.
"Includes these other states: California, Colorado, North Dakota, Okla-
homa, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, probably Oregon, and perhaps
Washington, Idaho, and Arizona. See 2 Wo aNtR op. cit. supra note 3,
§337.
"R. C. M. 1935, §§10138, 10257 et seq.; Black v. Story (1887) 7 Mont.
238, 14 P. 703; In re Higgins' Estate (1895) 15 Mont. 474, 39 P. 506;
Page v. Tucker (1880) 54 Cal. 121; Rice v. Carey (1915) 170 Cal.
748, 151 P. 135; Bishop v. Locke (1916) 92 Wash. 90, 158 P. 997.
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heir or devisee being concluded by such representative's acts.'
However, even in these states the title to the realty vests at once
in the heirs or devisees, the personal representative having only
a possessory right.'
Montana has upheld and applied these principles in a num-
ber of decisions pursuant to the provisions of the Code. Among
the more important decisions in this state may be included the
following: Black v. Story" held that an administrator could
bring an action of ejectment. In re Higgins' Estate' held that
an executor, after duly qualifying, has a right to the possession
of the realty and consequently the rents and profits. Murphy
v. Nett," which cites In re Higgins' Estate with approval, held
that the executor or administrator has exclusive right of con-
trol over the estate for the purpose of administration, subject
only to orders of the district court. In In re Dolenty's Estate"
it was held that the personal representative was chargeable, not
only with the assets of the estate which actually came into his
hands but also with those-including rents and profits of realty
which in the exercise of ordinary care and diligence ought to
have been received from it-which by reason of his neglect he
has failed to get into his hands. The court held, in deciding
In re Deschamp's Estate,' that on the death of the testator the
real property devised vests in the devisees from the moment of
the testator's death; and, subject to the right of the executors
to the possession of the property for purposes of administra-
tion, the devisees may sell or dispose of the property as they
please. The rights of executors to possession intervene between
the vesting of title in the devisee and his right to possession,
but only for purposes of administration. It was held in In re
Bradfield's Estate' that, while it was the testator's duty not to
152 WOEsNBm op. Cit. supra note 3, §337 and cases cited.
"R. C. M. 1985, §§7040, 10138, 10139; In re Deschamp's Estate (1922)
65 Mont. 207, 212 P. 512; In re McGovern's Estate (1926) 77 Mont.
182, 250 P. 512; Swanberg v. National Surety Co. (1930) 86 Mont.
340, 283 P. 761; Estate of Woodworth (1867) 31 Cal. 595; Packer's
Estate (1899) 125 Cal. 396, 58 P. 59, 73 Am. St. Rep. 58; In re De Ber-
nal's Estate (1913) 165 Cal. 223, 131 P. 375; Ostlund's Estate (1910)
57 Wash. 359, 106 P. 1116, 135 Am. St. Rep. 990.
"(1887) 7 Mont. 238, 14 P. 703, overruling Carrhart v. Montana Min-
eral Land & Mining Co. (1870) 1 Mont. 245, which had held that an
administrator could not bring ejectment, but which had been decided
under statutes (modeled after Missouri statutes) then in force and
differing from those applicable now.
"(1895) 15 Mont. 474, 39 P. 506.
"(1915) 51 Mont. 82, 149 P. 713.
"(1916) 53 Mont. 33, 161 P. 524. And see also In re Jennings' Estate(1925) 74 Mont. 449, 241 P. 648 to the same effect.
"(1922) 65 Mont. 207, 212 P. 512.
(1923) 69 Mont. 247, 221 P. 531.
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deliver possession of rents and profits of realty specifically de-
vised until expiration of the time for filing claims against
the estate and he did so at his peril, there was no injury where
there were ample funds to pay debts without use of this money.
The rule established in Swonberg v. Natioal Surety Co." was
that decedent's realty may be included in assets of the estate-
that term meaning all of the estate which may be subjected to
the payment of debts and which the executor or administrator
takes as such.
Thus we may conclude that the personal representative has
a right to the rents and profits of realty during the period of
probate administration in Montana. As indicated in the above
discussion several other western states have similar laws,"
whereas that prevailing in the rest of the country would give
the representative no such right except on court order after a
showing of need for purposes of paying debts of the estate, his
right being permissive and not mandatory."
The question now arises: Can the executor take the rents
and profits of land specifically devised if needed to pay debts
of the decedent?
Taking Montana as an example, where no priority as be-
tween realty and personalty as such is observed, and where
a statute" gives the order of resorting to an estate for purposes
of paying the debts of an estate, we find these general prin-
ciples apply: The personal representative is required to take
all the estate into his possession during the period of probate
and to release the realty, and incident thereto the rents and
profits accrued from such realty, to the devisees or heirs en-
titled only on express order of the court. This is also the rule
in those states having statutes similar to Montana." And where
the property enumerated in the first four classes of R. C. M.
1935, Section 7053 has been exhausted or become otherwise un-
available, all property specifically devised becomes liable ratably
to the payment of the debts regardless of the nature of the
"(1930) 86 Mont. 340, 283 P. 761.
"See note 13 supra.
"Butler v. Quinn (1932) 40 Ariz. 446, 14 P. (2d) 250; Lee v. Moore
(1927) 37 Ga. App. 279,.139 S. E. 922; McCarty v. McCarty (1934)
356 Ill. 559, 191 N. E. 68, 94 A. L. R. 1137; Hodgkinson v. Hodgkin-
son (1933) 281 Mass. 463, 183 N. E. 708; Thomas v. Kunkel (1935)
170 Okl. 100, 38 P. (2d) 527; In re Hornstra's Estate (1929) 55 S. D.
513, 226 N. W. 740.
"R. C. M. 1935, §7053.
"R. C. M. 1935, 1§10138, 10139; Murphy v. Nett (1915) 51 Mont. 82,
149 P. 713; In re Bradfield's Estate (1923) 69 Mont. 247, 221 P. 531;
In re Gentry's Estate (1932) 158 Okl. 196, 13 P. (2d) 156; Morrell v.
Hamlett (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) 24 S. W. (2d) 531. And see ATKiq-
so ow Wnis (1937) §262 and cases cited.
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devise, whether made for a valuable consideration or for chari-
table purposes, and notwithstanding equities existing in favor
of certain devisees which might entitle them to a conveyance of
the land devised to them." Because of the commendable view
taken by most probate courts in making all proper efforts to
get the realty to the person intended in its original state, it
would seem that if the debts were small enough so that they
might be satisfied by a use of the rents and profits accruing
during the period of administration of an estate or within a
short time thereafter, they ought to be applied to such pay-
ment in order to prevent a sale of the realty. A devisee would
much rather lose the rents for a short while than lose the entire
estate and have to take the balance of the purchase price in
lieu thereof. Such a result may be inferred from the language
of the court in the case of In re Bradfield's Estate noted above.
It should be noted here that it is generally held that where
it appears that a sale of the realty will be necessary in order to
pay the debts, an order of the court is necessary in all states-
even those listed above in which the personal representative is
entitled to possession of all property during the period of ad-
ministration"--except of course where the power of sale is spe-
cifically given the executor under the terms of the will. In
most states if there is no order to collect rents but only an or-
der to sell the realty to pay the debts, the intermediate rents
between the death of the decedent and the confirmation of the
sale of the real estate to pay the debts go to the heir or devisee,
not to the purchaser." This last rule would prevail in all those
states that do not give possession of the realty to the personal
representative during administration. It would not apply in
Montana because the representative would probably apply sums
realized from rents and profits to payment of the debts along
with the sums obtained from sale of the realty since he has both
in his possession for that purpose.' Thus, it is safe to say that
in Montana the executor may take the rents and profits of
realty specifically devised if needed to pay debts, with some
doubt as to other jurisdictions---the answer there depending on
their particular statutes and decisions. California would prob-
ably reach the same result as Montana since our code is largely
"In re Tuohy's Estate (1905) 33 Mont. 230, 83 P. 486.
"2 WOERNEB Op. OU. 8upra note 3, §5337, 338.
"'3 WoimzEia Op. cit. snpre note 3, §463, 464.
yR. C. M. 1935, §§7052, 7053, 7057, 10138, 10139, 10195, 10257, 10282.
And see In re Tuohy's Estate (1905) 33 Mont. 230, 83 P. 486; In re
Bradfield's Estate (1923) 69 Mont. 247, 221 P. 531; In re McLure's
Estate (1926) 76 Mont. 476, 248 P. 362; Swanberg v. National Surety
Co. (1930) 86 Mont. 340, 283 P. 761.
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an adaptation of that of California. The decisions of the Cali-
fornia courts seem to justify such a conclusion."
An interesting question which would be likely to arise only
in those states where the executor has a right to the possession
of the entire estate during administration, now presents itself:
If the rents and profits were not needed for payment of debts,
could a legatee satisfy his legacy from such rents and profits
at the expense of the specific devisee where the rents and
profits were not specifically charged with the payment of such
legacy ?
Montana has held that in marshaling assets executors may
take into possession everything that belongs to an estate, and
may receive the rents and profits from real estate specifically
devised, for the time named in R. C. M. 1935, Section 10138; but
that he receives them as security for payment of debts or ex-
penses of administration, and if they are not needed for that
purpose he may not call on such security to enhance the amount
which passes to the residuary legatee at the expense of the holder
of title to the land specifically devised." The language of the
court is broad enough there to include any legatee. This hold-
ing seems right and just if rents and profits are to be considered
and treated as realty and not as personalty by the courts. An
additional ground for such a holding is that it was the probable
intention of the testator that the rents and profits should go
with the realty to the specific devisee where he has not men-
tioned them otherwise in his will.
-- Grover C. Schmidt, Jr.
SURETYSHIP: DEFENSES OF SURETIES AND GUAR-
ANTORS UNDER R. 0. M. 1935, SECTIONS
8188 AND 8201
C was surety upon B's bond to A. A and B agreed
that the interest rate thereon should be reduced. C was
held to be discharged.'
A leased certain property to B at a rental of $28,000
per year. C guaranteed due performance by B. Subse-
quently A agreed to reduce the rental to $23,000 per year.
"See especially In re De Bernal's Estate (1913) 165 CaL 223, 131 P.
375. And also see Estate of Woodworth (1867) 31 Cal. 595; Wash-
ington v. .Black (1890) 83 Cal. 290, 23 P. 300; In re Izedorio's Es-
tate (1920) 100 Cal. App. 469, 280 P. 171.
"In re Bradfield's Estate (1923) 69 Mont. 247, 221 P. 531.
'Board of Commissioners of Fillmore County v. Greenleaf (1900) 80
Minn. 242, 83 N. W. 157.
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